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The paper explores the crisis in modernity's incapacity to address the Other 
in various overlapping domains, those of 'religion', 'woman', 'tradition' and 
'non-western societies'. It argues that this incapacity, intrinsic to the very 
construction of modernity, has seriously weakened secular modern 
emancipatory projects not only in the west, but within countries like India. In 
India, projects strong among Indian intellectuals, such as feminism, 
secularism and socialism, face a crisis in their capacity to oppose the rise of 
Hindu. religious nationalism. The paper explores the weaknesses in these 
projects particularly in their understanding of human agency, through a 
detailed examination of the way religion has been constructed in modern 
understandings of belief, ritual, choice and tradition. 
This paper is dedicated to addressing an ongoing crisis in modernity in its 
inability to converse with the Other, let alone develop a way of living with the 
Other. In this paper I will discuss this crisis as one that is intrinsic to the way in 
which modernity has constructed its own identity, in a series of interconnected 
distinctions and forms of difference. I will deal with three of these overlapping 
constructions, which are central to modernity: religion, women, and non-western 
societies. All three have formed part of the discursive archive through which 
modernity has defined itself against the so-called traditional. Through a series of 
overlapping oppositions, modernity comes to view itself as primarily rational, 
owing little to societies outside a self sufficient Europe, effecting a definitive break 
from a universe governed by religion. Reason, although covertly embodied in the 
male body, is understood as the cultivation of a mental faculty, as above the body. 
The traditional, by default, comes to be understood not only as the opposite of 
rationality, but by extension, of human agency itself - as that which must be 
repeatedly superseded in acts of innovation. Instead of being recognised as an 
attribute of all human existence, agency comes to be defined in ways that are 
unique to a European heritage. This is Charles Taylor, reflecting on what he 
describes as the modern construction of agency. 
What is striking about persons, therefore, is their ability to conceive different 
possibilities, to calculate how to get them, to choose between them, and thus 
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to plan their lives.... Choice is properly choice in the light of clear 
evaluation. To the human capacities thus conceived, the power of clear and 
distinct representation is obviously central ... what makes an agent a person, a 
fully human respondent, is this power to plan. ( 1985: I 05). 
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Taylor describes the ideal of freedom as one of disengagement, one that 
valorises the ability to act on one's own, without outside interference. While this 
view is by no means the only tradition that has shaped modern views of agency, I 
have highlighted it because of its prominence in colonising Europe's detection of 
'un-freedom' in 'traditional' societies such as India. 
Religion, as that which is palpably not about disengagement, and which 
cannot necessarily be understood in terms of 'choice' and 'innovation', comes to 
be understood as the very opposite of freedom and even of agency. Yet 
modernity's constructions cannot be understood within its own terms. For all the 
revolutionary fervour and self-representation of its ideals as pure innovation, 
modernity's ideals owe much to traditions that are inherited rather than constructed 
entirely anew and afresh. Paradoxically, some of these traditions necessarily 
include the very religious traditions that are ostensibly being broken with. As 
Taylor points out, the ideal of the modern free subject is itself implicitly sustained 
by deep religious traditions in the west. The aspiration for disengagement is one 
which harks back to Greek and Christian roots, older desires 'to rise above the 
merely human, to step outside the prison of the peculiarly human emotions, and to 
be free of the cares and the demands they make on us.' (1985:112). As Louis 
Dumont explored over a lifetime of reflexive meditations, ideals such as western 
individualism stretch all the way back to early Christian ideals of adult individual 
choice, enacted in adult baptism (Dumont, 1986). 
Charles Taylor goes on to add that the aspiration to rise above the merely 
human is 'an aspiration which also has analogous forms in Indian culture, and 
perhaps, indeed, in all human cultures.' (1985:112). The analogy can only be 
sustained by abstracting from the politics of colonialism. While India certainly has 
ascetic and metaphysical traditions that aspire to the transcendence of moksha 
(salvation), they have only entered into Indian modernity in the context of complex 
negotiations and contestations between colonial and nationalist constructions of 
Indian tradition. What is lost in this process is the very possibility of describing 
Indian modernity in the terms Taylor employs to describe western modernity, 
namely, as 'a novel variant of [a] very old aspiration' (Taylor 1985:113). Instead, 
the colonial basis tor modernity was instituted on the construction of a lack or 
deficiency in the existing native society. The perception that native society was 
based on fundamentally religious principles was not simply an Orientalist 
construction of India, it was also, as Said's critique has elaborated, the basis for 
constructing 'the native' as fundamentally backward. 
We can glimpse the difference made by the colonial construction of 
'tradition' in the term 'communalism'. In Australia the term communal is 
innocuous, meaning community, and studies of inter-communal relations in this 
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university are understood to be a study of relations between communities. The fact 
that these communities are defined in Australia as relations between ethnic 
groupings (as in the Centre for Inter-communal studies at University of Western 
Sydney) itself calls for deconstruction. But in India the term is used for religion, 
and for what is understood as a fundamental pathology in Indian social structure. 
Communalism refers to inter-religious relations, and is always already infused with 
a dangerous pathology. Community is understood as fundamentally religious in 
structure, and communities defined by a religious essence are understood to be 
entirely unable to do anything but periodically come into violent conflict with one 
another. In his work on the colonial construction of communalism, Gyan Pandey 
(1992) explores a whole elaborate discourse that emerged as the pretext for 
surveillance on native propensities for communal conflict. As community was 
understood as religious, so all conflict became understood as religious. 
As a result of this orientalist construction of India, at least one Indian 
intellectual response has been to seek alternative explanations for violence in 
economic and class conflict. The secular Left has tended to point to the many 
instances where peasants, whether Hindu or Muslim, rose up against landlords. In 
the post-Independence era, a consistent antidote to Orientalist understandings of 
communalism has been sought in economic and class conflicts as the real root of 
religious violence ( cf. Engineer, 1995). Yet a casualty of this understandable 
response on the part of left, secular and socialist intellectuals in India has been the 
lack of resources with which to understand the participation of subaltern groups in 
religious movements. Within the perspective just outlined, these forms of 
participation can only be understood as misguided forms of action, blinded by 
ideology as to the nature of their true class interests. 
The dilemma I refer to is not confined only to socialists in India, but also 
extends to the closely related politics of the women's movement in India - a 
movement Penny Magee was particularly interested in and followed keenly. 
Feminism in India - and India is one of the few countries where the term has 
traveled well (cf. John, 1996, Ram and Kauanui, 1998) and not been rejected by all 
as a purely western term - has understood itself to have a monopoly on mobilising 
female agency. The underlying assumption at some very fundamental level that 
was seldom made explicit until recently, is that the traditional social structure can 
only victimise women, requiring the intervention of modern forces such as feminist 
analysis and action, to introduce female agency into the picture. The assumption 
has a long history, going back to the way in which colonial agendas in India 
framed the un-freedom of women as the mark of a lesser civilisation, one not yet 
ready to exercise self government. This representation of the liberation of female 
agency from indigenous patriarchy as requiring the intervention of the (post) 
colonial state is a widespread one in the postcolonial world, whether in state 
programs of family planning and population control (Jolly, 2001:21, Ram, 200 1), 
western interventions in the politics of countries such as Afghanistan, or in activist 
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programs of empowerment, although there are many distinctions to be drawn 
between such initiatives. 
The involvement of women in the Hindu nationalist initiatives has proved a 
resounding challenge to this fundamental assumption in the Indian women's 
movement. There have been large numbers of women actively defending and 
marching on behalf of sati in the 1980s (Kumar, 1993), helping to demolish the 
Muslim mosque Babri Masjid in 1991, and participating as active members of 
militant Hindu organisations. Tanika Sarkar and Urvashi Bhutalia introduce one of 
the first explorations of Women and the Hindu Right (1995) with reflection on the 
intimate dimensions of the crisis: 
Politically and methodologically this assertive participation in right wing 
campaigns, pulled many of our assumptions into a state of crisis for we have 
always seen women as victims of violence rather than its perpetrators and we 
have always perceived their public, political activity and interest as a positive 
liberating force. For we need to understand what we are faced with. For we 
do have before us a large-scale movement among women of the right who 
bring with them an informed consent and agency, a militant activism. If they 
are imbued with false consciousness then that is something that includes their 
men as well and if they are complicit with a movement that will ultimately 
constrain themselves as women, then history is replete with examples of 
women's movements that foreground issues other than or even antithetical to 
women's interests. (Sarkar and Bhutalia, 1995: 3-4) 
The most frequent diagnosis of this crisis is that the key categories of 
modernity have been taken over and appropriated by the Hindu Right (cf. Kapur 
and Cossman, 1996, Kumar, 1993). Categories such as majoritarian democracy are 
used by the Hindu nationalists as a justification for Hindu electoral supremacy, in 
a manner closely resembling the mobilisation of white supremacy in Australia by 
the One Nation party. Similarly in India, the phenomenon of female public 
activism has been appropriated as a feature of Hindu militancy. 
That such appropriation has occurred is true - however, the responses to the 
crisis necessarily need to be varied and far ranging. Within India, the responses 
from feminists have been critical of the categories of modernity to varying degrees 
(see for example Sarkar and Bhutalia, I995, Kapur and Cossman, 1996, but also 
Joseph, 1998). In what follows I will argue that the categories of the 
Enlightenment stand in the way of a more genuine understanding not only of 
Indian experience, but of human experience more generally. I focus on a re-
construction of what we mean by 'agency'. In the colonial and post-colonial 
context, where agency has been constructed in opposition to religion, and where 
religion is assumed to be at the core of tradition itself, a reconstruction of agency 
necessarily takes us into the domain of reconstructing our understandings of 
religion. In taking this approach I differ somewhat from the critiques of 
Orientalism, which have concentrated on showing that tradition does not 
necessarily consist simply of religion but of state power and politics as well (see 
for example Dirks, I987). These critiques have sought to show that the Indian past 
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is not static, but dynamic and changing. However, they tend to leave intact the 
construction of religion as static, looking instead to the pre-colonial states as the 
motor and engine of change and dynamism. Applied to the present, this stance 
does little to shed light on the mass participation of subaltern groups in religious 
nationalism except by once again reducing the phenomenon to the state as the 
principal actor. By contrast, I wish to argue that weaknesses of the secular-left and 
its construction of religion as its Other need to be addressed in order to understand 
why other political forces are more successful at mobilising millions in the name 
of religion. 
Religion as lived experience, and the categories inherited from 
the Enlightenment: 'beliefs' versus 'customs, rituals and 
practices'. 
In the rest of this lecture I will be concerned particularly with the way that 
the Enlightenment-based constructions of religion have contributed to a thorough 
going misrepresentation of the way human beings fundamentally live religion. In 
particular I am concerned with the carving up of religion into components that 
replicate the more fundamental division between mind and body: the category of 
'beliefs' against which are clustered 'customs, rituals, practices'. 
In his Genealogy of Religion (1993), Tala! Asad is particularly concerned 
with the de-legitimisation of religion as a public, shared phenomenon. In this 
context he argues that it was on the basis of a privatised representation of religion 
that eighteenth century that Europe was able to dismiss religion as inadequate and 
unable to provide for a common morality or a public language of rational criticism. 
Central to this privatised representation of religion, is the category of' belief'. 
Once again, this privatisation is not entirely the work of modernity. Rodney 
Needham points to the centrality ofthe category of belief in the Christian tradition: 
The opening words of the Christian confession of faith, the Creed, define the 
'interior state' of the adherent by the declaration 'I believe in God'. 
(1972:20) 
However, pre-Enlightenment Christianity also included theological traditions 
of faith which actually worked in favour of the unprovable. In the context where 
the object of belief is not the world but God and his miracles, notably the miracle 
of Resurrection, then the very absence of conventional forms of justification in 
terms of truth criteria works as a marker of the uniqueness of religious belief- it 
enters the realm of faith: 
Aquinas argued that belief (or faith) is superior to reason because it is 
an assent to a transcendental truth, and that by definition to believe 
(credere) is to believe in what is true; if its object is not true, it cannot 
be faith. (Lopez, 1998:23). 
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By contrast, the Enlightenment brings with it a version of 'beliefs' as so many 
constructs held in the mind of the believer, and further, as constructs that have been 
consented to by the believer. In a study of the English Enlightenment, Harrison 
(1990) traces the transformations wrought by Calvin and the Protestants fighting 
against the 'Popishness' and paganism of Catholicism. In this context, the 
emphasis on belief becomes translated into Christianity as a core of belief 
statements entertained and agreed to by the believing and consenting subjects: 
In the highly charged atmosphere of post-Reformation controversy, creeds 
were statements in which expression was given not only to what was thought 
to be central to Christian belief, but also to those beliefs which distinguished 
this or that branch of Christianity from other heretical or erroneous forms. 
The perceived need for explicit knowledge together with the reframing of 
articles of belief led to the publication of numerous summaries and 
catechisms based on the Protestant confessions. These were essentially 
pedagogical tools designed to instil into the believer the essence of the 
Christian Religion. (Harrison, 1990:20). 
In this Protestant version, religion becomes entirely a matter of interiorised 
mental states, whether as beliefs or as systematic creeds that can be held in the 
mind and agreed to or dissented from. Such a version of religion was contrasted 
favorably with the outward formalistic ritual bound nature of Catholicism. Yet it 
also counted for less than knowledge: 
In philosophical literature, belief has often been portrayed as a mental state 
of assent to a proposition already contained in the mind, although the nature 
of this assent has been much debated. For Hume, belief is 'nothing but a 
more vivid and intense conception of any idea.' Belief is often portrayed as 
weaker than knowledge, since one may believe something that is either 
factually true or false, whereas knowledge only knows what is true. In Kant's 
terms in the Critique of Pure Reason, belief is a judgement that is 
subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient. Thus, knowledge has 
sometimes been defined as 'justified true belief. (Lopez, 1998:22) 
A central core of religion thus comes to be equated with ideational content in 
the mind of the believer which is either supported or not supported by evidence. In 
anthropology, according to Needham, belief plays an unchallenged and central role 
in the characterisation of religion: 
In social anthropology, the definition of religion conventionally includes 
belief as an indispensable component: eg. Durkheim defines it as a 'unified 
system of beliefs and practices'; Radcliffe-Brown thinks that the most 
satisfactory definition of religion is that it consists of 'a belief in a great 
moral force of power' and Geertz in an elaborate redefinition of religion, 
even has it that religious performances are 'not only models of what they [the 
participants] believe, but also models for the believing of it.' (1972:21) 
I have come to describe this as the mentalist conception of religion. 
Mentalism is as troubling as biologism, indeed it forms the other part of what is 
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really a doublet. Yet it has received far less attention in contemporary critique than 
the biologism ofthe body. In popular critiques ofmedicalisation, "belief' plays the 
automatic part of the preferred alternative to biologism. Followers of 'alternative' 
therapies have little alternative but to frame their allegiance in terms of mentalism. 
Yet beliefs, with their reliance on a subject who is framed entirely by his or her 
state of consciousness, locks the believer into mental states that are quite separate 
from the world about which the believer entertains beliefs. In a world where 
science has rendered the world knoweable in terms of reliable 'evidence', the 
believer who entertains non-scientific beliefs is doubly isolated from the world. 
I have already stated that mentalism forms one part of a doublet, the other half 
of which refers entirely to the body. We do not need to go outside of religion to 
encounter this bifurcation. The other categories through which religions came to be 
classified - customs, rituals and practices, - all bear the mark of being the inferior 
remainder of the valued half of mentalism. The remainder emerges drained of a 
mental dimension, as well as of the most highly valued mental state of all, that of 
consent. Instead, it is understood primarily as the domain of bodily practices, 
performed in conformity to an authority that is not internal like the mind, but 
external, located in the rules and prescribed authority of institutional religious 
authority and tradition. 
In his examination of the concept of 'ritual', Asad (1993:55ff) finds the 
following successive understandings: 
1771 Encyclopaedia Brittanica: refers to a book that directs the order 
and manner to be observed in celebrating religious ceremonies; 
1797 (third edition): adds ancient heathens to those who possess 
rituals 
1910 (eleventh edition): a much more elaborated definition drawing 
in references to the work of anthropologists such as Tylor, Lang, 
Frazer etc.; includes evolutionist assumptions. Asad finds a shift 
from the notion of a script to ritual as a type of behaviour that 
symbolizes or expresses something. 
Applied to colonised societies like India, such representations were even more 
elaborated and consequential, forming part of the scientific and administrative 
understanding of India. The Ethnographic Survey of India was incorporated as part 
of the census operations from 1901 onwards (Robb, 1995). The '27 point format' 
drawn up in 1885 by HH Risley for the ethnographic survey of India bifurcates the 
investigation of India along the lines of the bodily and the cultural. The body to be 
investigated was the racialised body of anthropometry while the 'cultural' 
component investigates customs, manners, beliefs, habitation and so on. Both 
components shared the racialist premises of evolutionary science. Anthropometry 
brings to a climax the transposition of the physical sciences on to the social world 
with measurements of the 'nasal index' used by Risley to distinguish between 
'Aryan' and 'Dravidian' physiques, and in turn relate them to social status in the 
caste hierarchy (' .. .it is scarcely a paradox to lay down as a law that a man's social 
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status varies in inverse ratio to the width of his nose'). The ethnographic 
questionnaire and its categories drawn up by a committee of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1874 was heavily influenced by EB 
Tylor who had just published Primitive Culture in 1871. The questionnaire method 
of bureaucratically inspired questions was soon found to be inadequate if theorists 
were to 'reach the theological stratum in the savage mind' -inquirers were urged 
rather to watch 'religious rites actually performed, and then to ascertain what they 
mean' (cited Stocking, 1992). The traditions of scientific field work in turn shaped 
traditions of anthropology undertaken by Indians, which also began very early, as 
with the work of AK Iyer who conducted ethnographic surveys of the princely 
states of Cochin, Mysore and Travancore (Ram forthcoming). 
Ethnographic surveys divide along the mentalist and bodily components, not 
once but repeatedly. We have anthropometry as the bodily component juxtaposed 
to religion as cultural component. In turn, religion breaks down into mentalist and 
bodily components. If beliefs reduce social practice to the entirely mindful subject, 
then the notion of rituals and customs denotes a mindless submission to an 
externally directed, prescribed form of practice. In Durkheim, rituals and rites are 
not devoid of agency - indeed, they are the very core of the creation of a shared 
and emotionally charged sense of collective belonging. Nevertheless, the division 
between the interior and privatised world of beliefs and the shared, bodily and 
emotional world of rites continues to shape the discourse. 
Ritual practice is thus reduced to routines that are as public as beliefs are 
interior, as bodily as beliefs are mental, as directed from without as beliefs are a 
matter residing within the subject. These antinomies between bodily submission 
and mindful attention, between stabilising functions and conscious change, 
between body and mind, are not evenly balanced - the former is in each case the 
lesser term in the construction of modernity. 
This hierarchy is made clear in the evolutionary classification in which ritual 
is more primitive than myth, sacred lore, and doctrine. The 1910 entry of the 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica states that in primitive religion it is ritual that generates 
and sustains myth. The rigidity associated with ritual continues to be posited even 
within the highest religions, designated as the component that signifies the 
dogmatism of doctrine (cited Asad, 1993:59).) 
These meanings enter into the reform and critique of tradition within India as 
well as its defence and valorisation. Attempts at defending 'Hinduism' 
strengthened this understanding rather than departing from it. For example, groups 
such as the Theosophists, particularly popular among Brahmin circles in Madras in 
the late nineteenth century because of their Sanskritised understanding of 
Hinduism, defended a universal brotherhood of religions on the basis of affinities 
they found between Theosophy on the one hand, and a Sanskritised Hinduism and 
Buddhism on the other. These affinities were discovered, however, by proceeding 
from Christian formulations of Hinduism and Buddhism. For instance, Colonel 
Olcott, one of the founders of the Theosophical movement made an influential 
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effort at representing Buddhism as a catechism. The Buddhist Catechism, based on 
English translations of the Buddhist texts, is based on several key assumptions: that 
there is a core canon of basic beliefs (four noble truths, eightfold path); second, that 
these beliefs are a moral philosophical core corrupted by the accretions of popular 
superstitions (Catechism Question 186: "Are charms, incantations, the observance 
of lucky hours and devil dance a part of Buddhism? Answer.: They are positively 
repugnant to its fundamental principlies. They are surviving relics offetishim and 
pantheistic and other foreign religions.). (Lopez, 1998:30-31). 
An influential review of the anthropology of ritual by Catherine Bell (1992) 
attempts to resolve a pervasive association of ritual with the devalued category of 
action (as against thought) by referring to ritual as practice rather than as action. 
She argues for shifting our attention to strategies of ritualisation rather than 
focussing on ritual as an independent existing object. Ritualisation, in her view, 
produces 'practical knowledge' and 'the ability to deploy, play and manipulate 
basic schemes in ways that appropriate and condition experience effectively.' 
(1992:221). I have much sympathy with this view. However, unless the dilemmas 
posed by representing ritual are resolved, the same problems will haunt the way we 
conceive of 'practice'. Both ritual and practice are linked as the other side of the 
doublet that gives us mentalism. This is made even clearer by the 1910 entry of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica which likens ritual to habit: 
Ritual is to religion what habit is to life, and its rationale is similar, namely 
that by bringing subordinate functions under an effortless rule it permits 
undivided attention in regard to vital issues ... Just as the main business of 
habit is to secure bodily equilibrium ... so the chief task of routine in religion 
is to organize the activities necessary to its stability and continuance as a 
social institution. (cited Asad, 1993:57) 
The comparison is significant. Not only ritual, but habit, has been reduced in 
the process of the comparison. Habit is represented as that zone of daily life where 
the body takes over from the mind, where rules take over from the choosing 
subject. It is no coincidence that this is also the one zone of existence where the 
role of the past in shaping the present is not to be denied. The choice of habit as 
the closest comparison to ritual in religion is therefore telling. It is as if this 
opening on to the pas~ can only be understood in terms of a servitude to the past, a 
point where the choosing mindful subject ceases to be. 
At the heart of the failure to characterise both ritual and habit is the 
exclusivity of the inter-related choices we are offered: either the past or the 
present, either the mind or the body, either consent or submission. If we are to 
rescue the construction ofthe past from these forms of reductionism, the categories 
have to be re-formulated not in isolation, but as part of an inter-related complex. 
Re-inserting or re-interpreting one category will not suffice. A recent stimulating 
attempt by Gauri Viswanathan (1998) to rescue the agency of Indians converting 
to Christianity in the colonial period, concentrates its efforts on restoring the inner 
convictions and beliefs of converts in order to balance existing explanations that 
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reduce conversion in India to various material and 'external' non-religious group 
considerations such as upward mobility for lower caste groups. Such a focus on 
belief is particularly salient in the context of representations of conversion from 
the Hindu Right, where conversion as a response to external inducements is easily 
dismissed as a mere veneer for an unchanged Hindu interior. Yet unless we resist 
the reduction of religion to inner mental states, and seek to simultaneously 
reformulate allied terms such as what is 'external' and 'material', we will not have 
an adequate vision of religion. 
Conclusion: agency and the lived present 
I have concentrated in this presentation on religion, and its misconstructions. 
The practical effects of these misconstructions are constantly felt - as when 
secularism is understood to mean signs of religion should not erupt in the public 
sphere, even if it be a head scarf on a Muslim girl's head at a state school. 
Evidently, such a version of religion could only be maintained by reducing religion 
to the sphere of purely internal beliefs, where the body bears no visible mark of 
membership in a religious community. 
However, the stake is ultimately higher than a correct understanding of 
religion. A notion of the past either as something to be consented to and mentally 
entertained ('beliefs'), or as something which, to the extent that we do not consent 
to it, dominates us as an externally imposed set of rules and bodily practices 
('habits', 'rituals'), denies us the tools with which to build either a satisfactory 
explanation of the present or a vision of the future. To the extent, then, that we 
move more closely into the phenomenology of experiences such as ritual and 
habit, I suggest we come a little closer to illuminating the wider domain of 
subjectivity. For modern reductionisms are not conjured up out of thin air. Both 
ritual and habit do involve a certain surrender of choice. Ritual is not interested in 
the flux of individual subjectivity. It requires a submission on the part of the 
subject. The transformative power of the ritual in life cycle ceremonies is a prime 
example of a social transformation of status that is achieved without any necessary 
element of choice being involved. The idea of acquiescence to a socially 
stipulated order being a positive act is itself a challenge to our received notions of 
agency. But what makes ritual even more of a challenge is that this relinquishing 
of authorship is not accompanied by a lack of conscious awareness. As Humphrey 
and Laidlor put it: . 
. . . actors in ritual are of course conscious and normally voluntary agents, and 
it is in this situation that ritualized acts may be apprehended and meanings 
may be attributed to them. The peculiar fascination of ritual lies in the fact 
that here, as in few other human activities, the actors both are, and are not, 
the authors of their acts. (Humphrey and Laidlor, 1994:6) 
A situation where 'actors both are and are not, the authors of their act' is riot 
unique to ritual. Trying to 'get it right' for ritual and religion can therefore help to 
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'get it right' for a whole range of situations that are at present confined by the 
categories of consent and authorship. It has direct implications for the feminist 
crisis that finds it near impossible to speak of the agency of women who are 
interpellated by identities of religion, community and ethnicity, except as victims. 
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